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Canadian Defence Planning
Between the Wars

The Royal Canadian Air Force Comes of Age
William J. McAndrew

F

or the first decade of its existence,
the Royal Canadian Air Force was
all but excluded from the military
planning process in Canada. Despite
its superb antecedents in the First
World War – more than 20,000
Canadians served in the Royal Flying
Corps and the Royal Air Force – the
air force barely survived postwar
reconstruction. When the fledgling
two-squadron Canadian Air Force,
which finally had been formed in
late 1918, was disbanded in Britain
in 1919, the future of Canadian
military aviation was left very much
in doubt. By 1920, a non-permanent
air force had been organized, and
two years later it attained separate
permanent status in a reconfigured
Department of National Defence.
There was no doubt, however, of the
RCAF’s subordination to the army.
As a minor cog in Canada’s militia
establishment, its senior officer was a
Group Captain whose military advice
was confined to technical matters and
then only on the rare occasions on
which it was asked.1 National defence
planning was a matter for the army
and to a much lesser extent the navy.
The Air Force’s theoretical role was
to provide support, like any other
fighting arm, on the First War model.
The RCAF found its raison
d’etre in civil aviation rather than in
military flying (the case for which had
a certain incongruity in the Canadian

Abs tract : During the inter war
period, the Royal Canadian Air Force
reoriented itself from an exclusively
civil to a military service. In doing so,
it assumed primary responsibility for
Canada’s direct home defence, put in
place a command and administrative
air defence structure spanning
Canada, and gained coequal status
with the other services. Moreover,
by 1939 the air force had on hand
a cadre of technically trained staff
officers prepared to take over the
many higher appointments created
by the expansion required to meet the
demands of the Second World War.

twenties), when it was made the
central government agency not only
to regulate and control the airspace
but to conduct civil flying operations
for the federal government. Initially
these centered on forest fire patrols
which gave way by the end of the
decade to an ambitious national
program of aerial survey. The range of
the service’s civil activities, however,
was remarkable – from conducting
buffalo and reindeer census to paying
Indian Treaty money, from crop
dusting to topographical mapping,
from medical rescue missions to
pioneering exploratory flights.
Military training as such was rare.
A few elementary inter-service
exercises were held, and the Camp
Borden training center ran regular
refresher and technical courses in
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the off season, but military aviation
rated a low priority. It was not until
1927 that the “bush pilots in uniform”
obtained their first military aircraft
since the war, a flight each of already
obsolescent RAF Atlas’ and Siskins.
Although it was fully
preoccupied with civil flying
operations, the RCAF never entirely
disregarded the military component
in its make-up. All but a few newly
commissioned RCAF officers had
served with the RFC/RAF/RNAS
during the past war, many with
combat distinction. Furthermore,
the RCAF was organized, trained,
and administered on the RAF model
and shared most of its customs and
traditions, from uniform patterns
to mess dinners. Even in the bush,
the eternal military verities had to
be observed, officers saluted and
trousers pressed. More important,
as early as 1922 the RCAF regularly
sent selected officers to Britain for
training in RAF establishments,
especially the Imperial Defence
and RAF Staff Colleges. In time, a
growing body of officers was exposed
to ideas and doctrine in the tactical
and strategic employment of aircraft.
“Schools for higher training are a
necessity if the flying officer is to
become something more than a mere
chauffeur,” declared Lord Trenchard,
the directing force of the RAF, and
he had insisted on forming separate
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Year

Appropriations

Flying Hours

Strength
(Permanent)

Military

Civil

Service

Civil

Officers

Airmen

1930

2,510,000

4,965,700

13,996

13,640

175

669

1931

2,266,000

3,066,000

19,172

11,185

177

729

1932

1,560,000

190,000

6,904

3,522

178

700

1933

1,405,000

292,000

7,272

3,491

103

591

firstly to train officers in staff duties

1934

1,930,000

332,000

8,721

3,746

106

586

whether in peace or war; secondly,

1935

3,130,000

1,176,364

12,010

4,050

118

676

to afford a general education which

1936

4,685,028

2,124,187

12,241

4,686

142

884

will serve as a sound foundation for

1937

11,391,650

361,000

17,417

2,361

148

959

the building up of a school of thought

1938

11,330,517

365,000

24,204

2,864

178

1,523

1939

28,450,515

325,050

261

1,930

devised with two objects in view;

in the Royal Air Force. It aims at
developing the habit of steady
reading and thinking rather than at
the acquisition of a mass of detail.3

Th e t e a ch i n g i t se l f , w h i ch
concentrated on imperial and small
wars (until 1939 the major war game
was based on mounting a counter
to a Turkish threat to Mosul),4 had
little direct relevance to RCAF needs
but, as one RAF graduate later
commented, “The value was not in
the stuff but in the training I had in
absorbing it and dealing with it.”5
RCAF students customarily were
called upon to lecture on their
unique work in Canada and they
duly described what must have
seemed to their RAF peers, back
home from policing imperial deserts,
a somewhat esoteric life surveying
the Canadian back woods. They also
were exposed to what was rapidly
becoming conventional air force
wisdom, the Trenchardian doctrine
of employing bombers independently
as the prime air offensive weapon
to subdue the will and production
centres of the enemy. On his return to
Canada, a 1924 RCAF graduate, Wing
Commander J.L. Gordon, wrote, in
terms which Trenchard would have
approved:
It would appear…that in stressing
the necessity for establishing Air
Superiority prior to carrying out
aerial operations which may be of
vital importance to both an Army
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1944

1,260,168,000

38,756

140,626

1945

526,320,500

8,818

44,425

1947

89,587,140

2,140

10,486

and a Navy, the work of these two

We strike first, then, at another and

services must suffer considerably in

equally vital point, within range

the opening phases of any campaign.

of both our bombers and fighters.

There would appear to be only one

Well directed bombing will cause a

practicable means of establishing this

clamour for protection. The tendency

very much desired condition, and

will be for the enemy to divert some,

that is offensive operations against

maybe all, of his fighters to defend

the enemy’s means of production…

the threatened point.

It should be realized…that offensive
operations in the air, as distinct from

But the result will not be a

purely cooperative measures, should

proportional increase in resistance to

concentrate on what must eventually

our attacks. We have the advantage

be their main object. This, it seems,

of initiative, choice of objectives,

is the principal centre of the enemy.

approaches, methods, and times of

6

attack. Also, being forced on to the

Later Canadian students
also easily absorbed the dogma
of bombing. As Squadron Leader
G.E. Wait wrote following his Staff
College tour, “The moment war is
declared, Air Power must be ready
to exert direct pressure upon the
enemy’s internal organization.”
Centers vital to the enemy’s warmaking capacity would be the prime
bombing targets but “to safeguard
her home interests,” the possibility
could not be ruled out that Britain
might “be forced into direct air
attack on enemy populations.” In
any event, “civilian casualties will be
unavoidable,” but, “C’est la guerre.”
Offensive bomber forces possessed
unprecedented flexibility:

defensive will react adversely on the
morale of the defenders…7

On his return from the 1930 Staff
College course Flight Lieutenant
G.R. Howsam published “Canada’s
Problem of Air Defence,” which
brought bombing theories home
to Canadian realities. 8 Howsam
accepted the basic premises of air
power proponents that while aviation
resources employed with the navy
and army were subordinate to them,

Canadian War Museum 19800211-010

Air Force schools because to rely on
those of the older services “would
make the creation of an Air Spirit
an impossibility.” 2 The RAF Staff
College course of study, to inculcate
that air spirit, was

The RCAF Siskin Aerobatic Flight Team.
This aircraft was the only first-line
fighter the air force had until the late
1930s.

2

: Canadian Defence Planning Between the Wars The Royal Canadian Air Force Comes of Age

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013

59

3

Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Two Vickers Vedettes of No.5 Photo Detachment moored to a dock at Long Lake, Manitoba. Civil flying
operations in the Canadian north earned RCAF flyers the title of “bush pilots in uniform” during the 1920s.

In the last resort air power is one
of the instruments whereby a
nation is guarded, but without air
bombardment an air force becomes
an ancillary to the other services.
Abolish air bombardment and there
is no air power, no air striking force,
no air defence and no Air Menace.9

Canada’s military responsibility,
Howsam thought, had been clearly
defined at the 1926 Imperial
Conference which accepted the
principle that each component of the
Empire must provide, first of all, for its
own defence. Canada had remained
invulnerable from the possibility of

60
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air attack until then, but technological
advance would make coastal raids
from carrier aircraft feasible within
a short ten years. Fighters could
offer some defence, but the principal
means lay in using bombers to
attack the bases without which
enemy aircraft were useless. Heavy
bombers with a 450-mile operational
radius meant that allowing for ships’
night movement during which they
would be undetected, “no carrier
or other surface craft can approach
unmolested within 150-miles of our
shores if protection aircraft (bombers)
are employed.” An attack on Canada’s
Pacific coast was most likely and
to defend it “our requirements in
military aircraft are bombers, fighters
and flying-boats for the Air Force
proper. These are subject to air
strategy and would be employed
chiefly in Coast Defence.” Howsam
proposed to circumvent the high
costs of permanent units by forming
auxiliary squadrons with permanent
cadres initially on the scale of one
flying-boat and one bomber squadron

for each coast. “In the 20th Century
there may be a Seven Days War –
an air war.” Howsam concluded,
“the nation which can most quickly
beat its plough shares into swords
(bombers on the enemy) will win
the next war. The suggested peace
plan of Non-Permanent Squadrons
of Air Force is considered a step in
this direction.”10
It would be misleading to place
too much emphasis on these views.
Junior officers in any age publish
their own uncertain thoughts in
military journals, particularly after
the out-of-the ordinary intellectual
stimulation of a staff course. Howsam
tactfully made clear that he had
“no intention of tilting at Air Staff
opinion,”11 which, as late as 1933,
even after drastic financial reductions
had eliminated most flying, still
viewed civil operations as the RCAF’s
primary training mechanism,

Canadian War Museum 19920166-043

true air power was only achieved
through the independent use of
the air arm. “Bombers, supported
by fighters,” he wrote, “are the
embodiment of air power which is
applied by air bombardment.” While
fighters provided the means for
defence, which could be only partial
at best, bombers were the prime
weapon:

as it is considered that the experience
within limits is equally as valuable
as an equivalent amount of flying

4
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performed for strictly military

RCAF Aircraft Strength

training, and in addition, there is

1936

nothing better for the morale of
the force than a certain amount of
work of practical importance to the
Canadian War Museum 19750315-016

development of the country.12

Nor did the articulation of an air
doctrine indicate any alteration
in the Canadian defence planning
structure. Planning remained the
preserve of successive Army Chiefs
of the General Staff who, as far as
the record shows, felt little need
to consult their air force advisors
on policy matters, at least until the
mid-1930s. The process of thinking
about aerial options, therefore, was
important primarily in allowing
officers to evolve a modicum of
service identity – Trenchard’s “Air
Spirit” – which eventually might
be called upon. Howsam recalled
many years later, “We had no Staff
College in Canada at all. That level
of thinking, that level of doing,
was completely unknown. It was a
Godsend. Without it, we’d have been
absolute neophytes.”13

*****

1939

Service

Service

Siskin

8

Atlas

15

Shark

4

Vancouver

4

Hurricane
31

Civil

58

Training

46

Overall Total

135

19

Siskin

5

Atlas

13

Wapiti

22

Battle

10

Shark

11

Vancouver

4

Stranraer

8

92

Photographic and
Communications

48

Training
Overall Total

I

t is impossible to say how long the
existing civil-military relationship
would have continued without an
external stimulus for change. But
coincidentally in the early 1930s two
unrelated but equally incongruous
circumstances combined to jolt
the RCAF out of its civil and into
a purely military role. The first
was the Great Depression which
prompted the government to
decimate the aviation budget, thereby
setting in motion a chain of events
which led by 1936 to a structural
separation of civil from military

130
270

aviation. The second was the military
staff planning made necessary by
Canada’s participation in the Geneva
Disarmament Conference, which, by
requiring Canadian military planners
to reconsider their force levels, also
prompted them to reevaluate the
country’s strategic priorities and the
employment of the three services.14
It was fitting that disarmament
talks concerned with the utility and
ethics of bombing got under way
as Japanese bombs were falling on
Chinese cities.15 For Canada’s new
chief of the general staff (CGS),

Two aircraft at RCAF Station Jericho Beach, Vancouver, BC. On the left is a Vickers Vedette and on the right a float version of the
dependable De Havilland Moth trainer.
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An Armstrong Whitworth Siskin at Rockcliffe Air Station. Standing in front of the aircraft are (left to right): Flying Officer E.A. McNab,
Flight Lieutenant Victor Beamish, and Flying Officer E.A. McGowan. The three officers were members of the famed Siskin flight, which
thrilled thousands of spectators at air shows in Canada and the United States. McNab would later command No.1 Fighter Squadron
RCAF during the Battle of Britain and rise to the rank of group captain. Beamish, an RAF officer seconded to the RCAF, reached the
same rank before being killed in action in March 1942.

however, the timing was fortuitous
for other reasons. Since becoming
chief in 1928, Major-General A.G.L.
McNaughton had become convinced
of the need for a fundamental review
of Canadian defence planning and
the Geneva discussions provided a
convenient reason for proceeding.
Until 1930, the only completed
contingency plan for the employment
of Canadian troops was designed to
defend the country against American
attack (Defence Scheme No.1). This
envisaged mobilizing a 15-division
militia in a levee en masse to take the
field and hold until relief could be
ensured by the Royal Navy. The mass
militia force on which it depended,
however, never materialized in the
inter-war years as funds were not
made available to recruit and equip
it. Its only value was to provide a
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“worst case” scenario which gave a
rationale for organization, training,
and mobilization, which could be
adapted to other purposes.16 For its
part, the RCAF was not consulted
until 1927 when, at the request of the
Joint Staff Committee, the Director
allotted (paper) army cooperation
squadrons on the First War scale
of one to each (paper) division and
corps headquarters.
Defence Scheme No.1 had only
a tenuous connection with political
reality and it seems doubtful that it
ever would have been considered
at all had staff planners been given
clear political direction. This was not
forthcoming and “one searches the
records of successive administrations
in vain for evidence of anything
that could be described as a well-

considered and consistent military
policy,” Professor Stacey has written:
no responsible Canadian statesman
ever paused to ask himself these
simple and fundamental questions:
if this peace proves fleeting, what
is the nature of the menaces that
will threaten Canada? What form of
organization would offer the greatest
security against them? How far does
the existing organization satisfy these
needs?17

In the absence of a planning
mandate, McNaughton’s staff
raised many of these questions in
an appreciation of the country’s
defence requirements it completed
in January 1931. In the process it
demolished the case for an American
war. Noting that the evolution of

6
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events over the previous ten years
had invalidated the premises on
which Defence Scheme No.1 had
been based, the staff concluded that
the possibility of a continental war
had receded beyond the bounds of
realistic probability. Ties between
Canada and the United States had
grown so close, and international
conventions so inhibiting, that:

American differences had made any
sense at all in 1919, it no longer did
so in the 1930s.
The direct defence of Canada against
invasion by the United States is
a problem which in the last ten
years has become increasingly
susceptible to political solution, but
quite incapable of being satisfactorily
answered by Empire military

Provided Canada acts ethically

action…[therefore] organization of

and on the defensive, the United

the Militia Forces of Canada for a war

States must spurn the Treaty of 1909

of this nature is undesirable, even if

(which created the International

it were practicable.19

Joint Commission), defy the League
of Nations and forget the Pact of
Paris (Kellogg-Briand) in resorting
to invasion each and all impossible
to conceive under existing world
conditions.18

Certainly, from Canada’s perspective,
if an appeal to arms to settle North

Having rejected the concept of
a North American land war there
was no need to maintain the existing
unwieldy militia structure, and
McNaughton recommended that it
be reduced to a more manageable
seven-division level. The government
accepted the proposal, despite

considerable objections from militia
units which would be disbanded
or amalgamated, and was able to
offer it as tangible evidence of its
support for disarmament. As Sir
Maurice Hankey, the secretary to
the Committee of Imperial Defence,
noted, “By this step the Government
could take the credit for a large
reduction in establishments, and the
army would be the more efficient for
the reduction.”20
For the RCAF, the Geneva
discussions raised two quite
different immediate concerns. One
was the possible freeze of current
establishments which would then be
accepted as upper force limits; this,
of course, would have set the RCAF’s
military potential permanently at
zero. The other was the proposal to
restrict the habit of seconding military
aviators for civil duties. Although this
was meant to control the practice,

Canadian War Museum 19910109-199

The Armstrong Whitworth Atlas was a purpose-built army co-operation aircraft based on First World War experience. Here an Atlas
skims low over an airfield to practice a message snatch. Note the observer leaning over the side of the aircraft.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013
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especially by Germany, of masking
the build-up of military capabilities
behind a guise of civil flying, its
effect on the RCAF would have been
equally crippling. However, nothing
came of either possibility as the
Geneva talks ground to a halt amidst
the wrangling which accompanied
the breakdown of international
order.21
The significant aspect of
the disarmament events on the
development of the RCAF, however,
l a y p r i ma r i l y i n t h e st r a t e g i c
reassessment they had set in motion.
As long as the direct defence of the
country remained based on a mass
land army, the air force was relegated
to a subordinate, support role,
much as it had been on the Western
Front. When the oversize militia
was restructured, however, the air
force’s role in Canada’s defence
posture also was altered. The general
staff identified two contingencies,
neither of them new but now given
enhanced priority, for which plans
were required. One was participation
“in another overseas war in defence
of Empire security.”22 The possibility
of raising an expeditionary force for
imperial deployment – or the indirect
defence’ of Canada as it invariably
was termed – never had been far from
the minds of militia commanders
and staffs. Nor did it stray far now.
The option was so well entrenched
in a political no-man’s-land that it
could be approached only warily;
but planning proceeded in any
case, the RCAF’s role being limited
to supplying army cooperation
squadrons in support of ground
forces. The other option, in effect,
redefined the concept of “direct
defence.” The staff concluded that
any military threat to Canada likely
would materialize on the coasts as
a by-product of a war between the
United States and another power,
most probably Japan. Even if it was
able to avoid belligerency, Canada
would be forced to defend its coastal
borders as “the only alternative to
64
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active participation on one side or
the other.” Otherwise, “if Canada
does not take the requisite measures
to maintain her neutrality…the
United States would doubtless take
independent action, presumably on
Canada’s behalf.”23
Traditionally, of course, the
senior service had responsibility
for coastal defence, but the RCN’s
emaciated 1,000-sailor complement
was barely able to man the four
destroyers and few other smaller
vessels it could put to sea. To be made
effective, the navy needed either
a major ship acquisition program
or to be assured of immediate
reinforcement on the outbreak of war;
the former was politically impossible,
the latter technically unlikely. In the
CGS’ view, “the Canadian navy as
presently constituted is not an answer
to any problem of Canadian defence.”
McNaughton may have shared a
general landlubbers’ aversion to
salt water but he was also a realistic
pragmatist24 who was attempting to
fashion a coherent defence policy
within the paralyzing constraints
imposed by depression funding.
He also dominated the defence
establishment, both by the force of his
intellect and personality and his close
association with the Prime Minister
which gave him considerable political
influence. He was convinced that the
limited defence funds could be used
best in maintaining small, technically
impeccable, permanent cadres which
could quickly train larger forces
on mobilization. Coastal defence
required forces in being, but the RCN
was unable to present “a minimum
deterrent to seaborne attack…
Moreover it is of the nature of naval
forces that they cannot be rapidly
expanded to meet emergencies
and, in consequence, it seems to
me that little purpose is served in
maintaining a small nucleus.”25 The
air force, McNaughton concluded,
could replace the navy; aerial patrols
not only would be more effective
but were much less expensive; and

the RCAF could well assume the
responsibility as the country’s first
line of home defence:
Air Forces even in small numbers are
a definite deterrent in narrow waters
and on the high seas in the vicinity
of the shore; they can be developed
with considerable rapidity provided
a nucleus of skilled personnel in a
suitable training organization is in
existence; pilots engaged in civil
aviation can be quickly adapted to
defence purposes; civil aircraft are
not without value in defence, and
any aircraft manufacturing facilities
are equally available to meet military
as well as civil requirements. That is,
from a comparatively small current
expenditure a considerable deterrent
can be created in a relatively short
time, and this is particularly the case
in Canada where aviation plays a
large part in the economic life of the
country, a part which is increasing
naturally at a rapid rate.26

B

*****

y the end of 1931 the RCAF staff
had completed a preliminary
review of the units it would need
to meet its newly identified military
responsibilities.27 Then, when Group
Captain Gordon returned from
his course at the Imperial Defence
College in the spring of the new year,
he was relieved of his administrative
duties specifically to prepare the
more detailed plans the air force
required.28 In mid-July, Gordon’s staff
submitted a proposal for the “Peace
Organization and Establishments
of the RCAF considered necessary
to meet minimum requirements for
National Defence.”29
The paper, prepared by Squadron
Leader G.V. Walsh, 30 considered
three contingencies for which the
service must plan: direct or home
defence (coastal), the maintenance
of neutrality, and provision for an
expeditionary force. Of these, coastal
defence was the most vital, and it
was on this major concern that most
8
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The minister of National Defence, Grote Stirling, prepares for a flight in an Armstrong Whitworth Atlas.

planning throughout the remainder
of the 1930s concentrated. Coastal
defence included, Walsh noted,
“protection of important localities
and ports from air raids, defence
of the Pacific and Atlantic coasts
by means of coast reconnaissance,
anti-submarine patrols, co-operation
with coast defence artillery, and
protection of empire Air Routes
and Convoys.” 31 Seven Permanent
Force squadrons were required to
carry out the tasks, four of them
controlled by Group Headquarters
at Halifax and Vancouver, each with
one bomber and one flying-boat
squadron. The others were one army
cooperation squadron which would
maintain contact with the latest
doctrine and equipment in the United
Kingdom and provide a training
cadre for Non-Permanent army
cooperation squadrons required on
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013

mobilization; one fighter squadron
with a secondary bombing capability;
and one general purpose squadron
convertible either to bombers or
fighters. The army cooperation
squadron would be stationed at
Ottawa where it could work closely
with the militia, the fighter squadron
in Montreal where it would be
available to reinforce Atlantic coast
defences, and the general purpose
squadron at Winnipeg able to
reinforce Pacific defences. Two other
Group Headquarters, at Winnipeg
and Montreal, as well as sufficient
supply depots and administrative
services for an expanded force,
completed the command and
logistics structure. In addition, 12
Non-Permanent squadrons, four
each of fighter, bomber, and army
cooperation aircraft, formed in the
principal Canadian cities, would

provide further operational air
support on mobilization.32
Walsh’s numbers were revised
as his plan percolated upwards in
headquarters, but not fundamentally.33
Nor were his premises challenged.
The primary consideration for the
RCAF remained Canadian direct
defence, the requirements for which
were the same for either contingency
of countering enemy raids or for
maintaining the integrity of the coasts
to ensure Canadian neutrality. The
task required forces in being and
therefore home defence squadrons
had to be found from the permanent
force. As McNaughton viewed the
potential threat:
The outbreak of hostilities, under
present conditions, would today,
possibly, and tomorrow probably, be
signalized by an immediate attack by

65
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air. Indeed, such an attack might be
made before a formal declaration of
war had been made. It is conceivable
that attempted air attack from an
aircraft carrier might not be kept
secret, but direct attack (by transoceanic flight) could easily be kept
secret as the destination of aircraft
cannot be gauged as can that of naval
or Military Forces. Therefore, there
would not be time for any Canadian
Air Forces to expand in sufficient
time to meet an attack.34

The secondary needs of an
expeditionary force, which would
require a preparatory mobilization
period, would be met by nonpermanent units.
The changing face of war, as
noted by McNaughton, in which air
power was assuming much greater
significance, became a public matter
in Canada and the United States
in the spring of 1935. The occasion
was a leak to the press on closed
hearings held in February by the
House of Representatives Committee
on Military Affairs.35 The Committee
had heard testimony on legislation

to extend the existing network of
military airfields in the United States.
Several Air Corps officers sketched
scenarios indicating that the country
conceivably could be subjected to air
attack within a relatively short time.
One pointed out to the Committee
that the Douglas Company was
building a bomber able to carry a
2,500-pound bomb load for 3,000
miles at a speed of 225 mph. A hostile
coalition of powers, he thought,
would be able to establish temporary
seaborne logistical bases on the North
American continent to supply a fleet
of long-range bombers in an attack
on the continental United States.
“Fortunately or unfortunately,” he
informed the startled Representatives,
“the Creator has given countless
operating bases within a radius of
action of this country in the vast
number of sheltered water areas that
are available deep in Canada and far
removed from any sphere of action
of ground forces.” From James Bay,
Labrador, and Newfoundland, down
to Bermuda and the Caribbean, small
vessels carrying 2,000 tons of supplies
could establish “floating railheads

[which] can furnish all the gasoline,
all the bombs, oil, and ammunition,
spare parts, all the food that is
essential to take care of the operating
personnel of 15 bombers, as well as
the ground personnel for 30 missions,
each one of which goes in 1,500 miles
and comes back 1,500 miles.” With a
3,000-mile range, a European force
could fly to Churchill on Hudson
Bay, for example, timed to meet its
floating railhead. After refuelling
and arming up, they then could be
directed to pre-designated targets.
Unlike ground troops, their flexibility
precluded the need to concentrate
anywhere but in the target area:
“With the radius of action that we
have, they could move from points
in James Bay and along the Labrador
coast simultaneously and concentrate
over any place on the frontiers of this
vital area and deliver an attack in
mass against whatever targets you
want.” The only way to counter such
a potential threat, he concluded, was
by bombing the hostile bases. In order
to create this defensive capability, it
was necessary to locate and construct
more airfields, specifically a system in

A Blackburn Shark, with floats and folded wings, sits on the shore at RCAF Station Jerico Beach. The RCAF modified most aircraft
it obtained for use on rivers and lakes.
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each of the threatened regions of the
country with sufficient intermediate
stations to connect them.36 Canada’s
position was particularly strategic,
another officer emphasized. Even
if Canada itself was not actively
hostile, its neutrality would cause
problems because “neutrality
involves responsibilities as well as
rights, and flying across Canadian
territory would be a violation of
Canadian neutrality, and if they did
not take steps to carry out the laws of
neutrality we would have to do so, I
imagine.“37
Official reaction in Washington
to the leaked testimony was swift
and vehement. President Roosevelt,
his Secretary of State for War, and
the State Department immediately
repudiated the suggestion that the
United States viewed Canada in
anyway other than the best of “good
neighbours” or that any resort to
arms was conceivable. The officers
who testified, they made clear, did
not set United States’ policy and in
no way represented it; moreover,
the Committee was irresponsible
in making their private views
public. Apologies abounded, but the
legislation itself passed the House
in June and the Senate a month
later, both unopposed, and received
Presidential approval in August. (The
first site selected was at Fairbanks,
Alaska, in July 1936).38
Canadian reaction was generally
restrained. The Department of
External Affairs obtained a copy of
the hearings and asked the General
Staff for comment. Their report was
remarkably sympathetic with the
American military viewpoint. They
accepted the need to plan for all
contingencies, however unpalatable,
and thought “The United States is, in
consequence, obliged to contemplate
measures to protect itself from attack
not by Canada but via Canada.” The
staff agreed that the combination of
advancing technology and Canada’s
large and uninhabited coastline
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posed potential difficulties for
American planners but “there is no
record of their having uttered one
syllable of hostility towards Canada.”
Therefore,
No umbrage can properly be taken
by Canada at these disclosures.
Publicity has simply been given to
the fact that is known to the world
of Canada’s impotence with regard
to anti-aircraft defence. Not only are
our gates wide open but we have not
even the semblance of a fence and
our neighbour is, in consequence,
obliged to provide against our lack
of provision.39

Other Canadian comment
agreed. The Ottawa Evening Citizen
editorialized that the United States
had to look to its own defence, and
if Canada was not doing its share,
it was because the Government
had “virtually disbanded the Royal
Canadian Air Force.” Canada could
afford to ignore its responsibilities
no longer “unless the pretence of
nationhood is to be completely
abandoned.”40
The issues raised by the
Air Defences Bill officially were
acknowledged and extended that
fall in a staff study approved by
McNaughton’s successor, MajorGeneral E.C. Ashton. Although the
United States legitimately could be
concerned with a bombing threat, the
planners noted, “As the Eastern and
Western portions of Canada lie on
the Great Circle routes from Europe
and Eastern Asia to the United States,
respectively, it is clear that Canada is
still more exposed to air operations
from overseas…[consequently] the
continued supposition that Canada
is and will remain free from attack
by a trans-oceanic power is becoming
open to criticism.” The paper, which
was primarily concerned with
devising mechanisms to mobilize
the full resources of the country in the
event of war, emphasized that “the

question of air defence is becoming
one of increasing importance to this
country.“41
Despite McNaughton’s and
Ashton’s advocacy, however,
RCAF expansion proceeded only
imperceptibly. A battle of memoranda
ensued as the militia and air force
skirmished with the navy before
the Treasury Board for a share of
diminishing funds sufficient to enable
them to survive. The depression and
financial retrenchment continued
to win. Estimates through 1935
remained below the already stringent
1931 level and the air force neither
could maintain the manpower levels
established for the disarmament
proposals nor obtain suitable
aircraft.42 The only military machines
available in 1930 were the aging Siskin
fighters and Atlas army cooperation
machines bought earlier. The total
number of aircraft on hand in that
year was 235. Between 1930 and 1935,
143 machines were written off due to
age, crashes, or general deterioration,
and only 82 replacements were made,
leaving a balance in October 1935
of 174. These included 8 Siskins, 15
Atlas’, 5 converted Vancouver flyingboats, and 4 Shark torpedo bombers
for operational use in addition to 40
training and 45 civil types. It was
not much from which to fashion a
fighting force capable of protecting
the nation’s shores.43
A change in the political
climate had to precede any material
improvement, and this did not
begin until late in 1935 when the
depression-plagued administration of
R.B. Bennett gave way to Mackenzie
King’s Liberals. King’s resumption
of power could hardly have been
received optimistically by those
pressing for a larger defence budget.
The Prime Minister always had been
somewhat suspicious of the military.
For sound political reasons King had
to be extremely wary of Britain’s
claims to leadership and solidarity,
as imperial military ties could
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An RCAF Fairchild 71 is moored to the dock at RCAF Station Rockcliffe in October 1930. In front of the aircraft are (left to right): C.S.
MacDonald, Flight Sergeant H.J. Winny, Flight Lieutenant F.J. Mawdesley and Sergeant S.C. Dearaway.

easily involve Canada in foreign
entanglements. The services were not
equally suspect, however. The Navy
was hopelessly anglophile, and the
army, despite its protestations to the
contrary, always kept the notion of an
imperial expeditionary force well in
mind; but the air force was different.
In his earlier administrations, in
the 1920s, Mackenzie King had
looked favourably on the new service
because its active role in the economic
development of the frontier provided
obvious political advantages which
a purely military air force could
not. Now, in a different context,
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https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss1/7

the RCAF was placed once more in
most favoured status because of its
unsullied role in home defence.44

*****

A

ll this took time. It was not
until the following August
that King briefed himself on the
appalling inadequacies of the
three services. His diary records in
stunning detail the tortuous process
he underwent persuading first
himself, then his Cabinet colleagues,
and then the Liberal caucus that the
potentially disastrous combination

of accelerating international anarchy
and the complete absence of national
defences had to be faced. He was
partially successful. The inherent
nature of the problem meant that
there could be no quick solution,
but from the 1937-1938 fiscal year,
estimates began to rise helpfully.
Throughout the parliamentary
discussion, the government made
clear that priority was to be given
direct, national defence with the
RCAF manning the first line.45
Accordingly, the RCAF prepared
plans to implement expansion on
three-, five-, and ten-year programs.
12
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The estimated cost of the threeyear scheme was about $31 million
in the first year, $17 million in the
second, and $11 million in the third.
As well as for operational units
the estimates included funds for
larger training facilities, additional
instructors, housing, and ancillary
equipment. In comparison, the fiveyear program called for a first-year
expenditure of about $19 million
with the subsequent years scaled
proportionately. Ultimately the RCAF
cut its own first-year figures to $16
million and finally received only twothirds of it. The funding, of course,
went only part way in equipping
the air force, but it is arguable that
the existing industrial base could
not absorb much more in the early
stages.46 Modern aircraft were vitally
needed, but most countries were
rearming by this time and there were
not enough to go around. In any case,
a sound logistical foundation had to
be laid. As one staff memorandum
pointed out, accumulating stocks was
a long, drawn-out process:
There is a large and varied list of
equipment which represents a
considerable capital investment
required before the aircraft can be
maintained and operated efficiently.
These include, aircraft spares; rations;
clothing and necessities; motor
transport; motor transport gasoline
and oil; marine craft; miscellaneous
states including hand tools; work
shop equipment; electrical equipment;
parachutes; armament stores; bombs
and ammunition; barrack stores;
wireless telegraphy equipment;
photographic equipment; aerial
gasoline and oil; overhaul equipment
(engines and aeroplanes); printing
and stationery, etc.47

War overtook rearmament in
1939. In late August the RCAF’s few
ill-equipped, operational squadrons
deployed to their war stations on
either coast and began flying coastal
patrols almost immediately. It was
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013

not an air force to strike immediate
terror in the hearts of the enemy,
but fortunately the state of the art
precluded trans-Atlantic bombing.
It had just over 3,000 all ranks in
uniform, 11 permanent and another
12 non-permanent formed but
ill-equipped squadrons, and an
assortment of obsolescent military
aircraft – Stranraers, Vancouvers,
Sharks, Battles and Wapitis, along
with a few Hurricanes. These
numbers represented less than half
the men and a quarter of the fighting
aircraft the RCAF needed to perform
its primary function of defending
Canada’s coasts. There was nothing
left for other tasks. “Canada has
neither equipment nor trained
personnel in effective quantities
to offer the Royal Air Force at the
present time,” the Chief of the Air
Staff wrote in 1939. Therefore “we
can best help the United Kingdom by
concentrating our entire efforts, after
securing our home defence, upon the
production of the greatest possible
numbers of trained personnel in all
categories.”48
Measured against a standard of
effective national air defence, the
RCAF in 1939 clearly fell far short.
Measured against what it was able
to achieve over the next few years,
however, the RCAF had laid well
the basis for future success. Within a
relatively few years it had reoriented
itself from an exclusively civil to
a military service. In the process,
the RCAF’s defence responsibilities
had grown sufficiently to ensure its
service maturation from subordinate
status to complete independence. It
had, in fact, assumed the primary
responsibility from the navy and
militia for Canada’s direct home
defence. By 1938 the RCAF had
in place a separate command and
administrative air defence structure
spanning Canada, and its senior
officer had been granted co-equal
status with the other service
commanders as chief of the air
staff. Importantly, it also had on

hand a cadre of technically trained
staff officers prepared to take over
the myriad of higher appointments
an inflated war establishment
created. It was, consequently, able
to mobilize the country’s aerial
potential for war, conduct training
on the unprecedented scale of the
British Commonwealth Air Training
Plan, assume responsibility for antisubmarine and convoy protection
patrols, and contribute operational
squadrons to virtually all active
theatres of war.
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